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**FORWARD FROM THE SEA ...
INTELLIGENCE AND THE UNTOLD STORY OF
OPERATION NOBLE OBELISK**

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On May 25th, 1997, at the request of the State Department, Secretary of Defense William Cohen directed the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to begin contingency planning for evacuating American citizens and designated third country nationals from the small African country of Sierra Leone. On May 30th, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEU/SOC) serving as the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander and embarked on USS KEARSARGE (LHD-3) began executing Operation NOBLE OBELISK. Over the course of approximately one week, this Naval expeditionary force executed three non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO's) which accounted for safe removal of 2,509 American citizens and third-country nationals from Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. The apparent textbook execution of NOBLE OBELISK served to further validate the Navy-Marine Corps expeditionary team envisioned in *Forward ... From the Sea*. In the intelligence arena, NOBLE OBELISK served to reinforce many of the same concepts, however, it highlighted an area often understated, or assumed - the absolute criticality and necessity for on-scene intelligence personnel and organic surveillance capabilities.

The ability of a Naval expeditionary force to accomplish national policy objectives while operating in remote areas of the globe has been one of the central premises of the Navy and Marine Corps since its founding. With the publication of ... *From the Sea* in September of 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps rearticulated and developed a strategic direction aimed at responding to a full range of worldwide regional challenges and threats. This new emphasis centers on a "sea-air-land" team, forward

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ASSESSMENT ON AN AREA WHERE THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS
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deployed, and ready to respond immediately to the Unified Commanders as they execute national policy.¹ Further refinements published in *Forward ... From the Sea* (1994), *Operational Maneuver ... From the Sea* (1996), and *The Navy Operational Concept* (1997) support the original vision and are closely linked to the operational concepts presented in *Joint Vision (JV) 2010*. All these maritime strategies seek to capitalize the opportunities afforded by the Revolution of Military and Business Affairs (RMA/RBA).

When examined as a whole, the Navy and Marine Corps' strategic direction and the unique capabilities of the "Naval expeditionary force" offers policy-makers a broad range of capabilities, which can respond to the full range of conflict. The implication is clear; this mobile and forward deployed force will be increasingly called upon to respond to contingency situations and instability throughout the world. Its ability to respond, however, is exacerbated by the significant armed force reductions and the downsizing of U.S. overseas presence in the 1990's.

To counteract the inverse relationship between a smaller armed force structure and Naval expeditionary requirements, the Navy and Marine Corps has placed a significant emphasis on streamlining and upgrading the overarching command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture. This emphasis is within the context of COPERNICUS, the vision of integrating and streamlining C4ISR functions to support joint naval expeditionary operations in the 21st century. By harnessing the revolution in Information Technology (IT), the focus is on developing a Network-Centric architecture by incorporating sensor and engagement grids

¹ Department of the Navy, ... *From the Sea. Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, p. 3.

on a high-quality information backplane.² In essence, forward deployed units operating from remote locations will have access to value-added intelligence and near-real time sensor information derived from a combination of strategic and operational surveillance capabilities located at disparate locations. In theory, increased access to the information backplane will result in a higher degree of battlespace awareness. This leads to achieving information superiority, which results in increased battlespace dominance and power projection, and in short, enhances the Navy-Marine Corps ability to respond anytime, anywhere.

While few can argue the need for enhanced connectivity, information access, and interoperability between communication systems, there is a fundamental supposition around which all the new doctrines, architectures, and technologies are based, namely access to **accurate** intelligence or knowledge. During the Cold War, the intelligence community focused on the Soviet Union along with the Warsaw Pact and Communist China. With this in mind, systematic intelligence interest in other countries or regions, unless somehow tied to Soviet issues, was marginal at best.³ The National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and other members of the intelligence community have made significant efforts since the Cold War to meet the broad scope of intelligence needs. However, as with any organization focused on meeting high-level

² Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, <http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm>, p. 5.

³ James R. Clapper, Jr., "Challenging Joint Military Intelligence," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 1994), p. 93.

requirements, intelligence collection priorities will be geared primarily to meet major threats and issues that are deemed vital or important to our national interests.

Contingency operations in remote areas of the world usually meet the U.S.

"humanitarian" criteria, but do not meet the threshold of vital U.S. interests that are afforded a sustained intelligence focus.

Herein lies the heart of the issue, if Naval expeditionary forces are increasingly engaged in humanitarian missions across the globe, in remote areas that do not necessarily meet our vital interests, how will those forces achieve information superiority without access to accurate intelligence? Simply put, "In a contingency operation, how do you gain a fundamental baseline knowledge of a target where the U.S. intelligence community has historically had little access?"

This was the challenge during NOBLE OBELISK. While not vital to our longer-term national interests, the security situation in Sierra Leone posed a sufficient threat to U.S. citizens, which required a response. The numerous challenges facing the 22nd MEU(SOC) and KEARSARGE, stemmed from a very ambiguous security situation in Sierra Leone to a highly accelerated contingency planning cycle. Both of these factors would highlight the necessity for on-scene intelligence and organic surveillance capabilities.

In 1997, Sierra Leone had all the makings of a failed state very similar to Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1994. Since gaining its independence in 1961, Sierra Leone had suffered a series of military coups and rebellions in a struggle over political power. Complicating the issue, its people are composed of 18 different ethnic groups with different religious and tribal affiliations all living in a state slightly smaller than South

Carolina.⁴ Ethnic divisions are not bound by political boundaries, and there is a significant crossover into neighboring countries. Historically, this had made for a very loose border security situation and for tense relations with countries along its border. Despite a promising start after gaining its independence and having valued mineral resources in diamonds and bauxite, Sierra Leone could not capitalize on its assets due to its extensive internal strife, ethnic tension, and weak political system.

There were also numerous other factors that influenced the situation in Sierra Leone. In February 1996, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was sworn in as the democratically elected president. President Kabbah enjoyed the support of the Economic Council of West African States (ECOMOG), a Western African body led primarily by Nigeria. Additionally, ECOMOG had a peacekeeping mission role in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG forces were in control of key facilities and security checkpoints around Freetown. Another armed group operating in Sierra Leone was the South African mercenary group, Executive Outcome. This group's focus was in protecting mining and business concerns, although just prior to May 25th, they were in negotiations to provide protection to President Kabbah's government.⁵ Amidst these circumstances were several U.N and non-governmental relief organizations (NGO's) which had been providing assistance to refugees and the displaced populace as a result of Sierra Leone's continual unrest.

The escalation of hostilities were the result of continuing tensions between President Kabbah and the various nationalistic factions in Sierra Leone, which coalesced around the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). On May 25th, a coup was staged by a

⁴ U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Public Affairs, *Background Notes: Sierra Leone*, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/af/sierraleone9406.html>, p. 1.

⁵ Daily Mail & Guardian, "Too late for the mercenaries," <http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97june1/30may-sierraleone.html>, p. 1.

group of military officers calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). This group of disaffected officers joined forces with the RUF. President Kabbah fled the country to Guinea, and neither the AFRC/RUF nor the Nigerians could prevent the massive looting, killing and violence that occurred after the coup. Businesses and homes were ransacked. Civil authority dissipated while the AFRC/RUF's tried to consolidate their power and focus on the threat posed by ECOMOG forces. Rev. David Caulker, the longtime pastor of the large King Memorial United Methodist Church in Freetown stated that he had never seen things as bad as they were in all his life.⁶

Another major obstacle facing the Naval expeditionary force was an accelerated contingency planning cycle. KEARSARGE had sailed two weeks early to relieve 26th MEU(SOC) embarked on USS NASSAU (LHA-4) which had been engaged in Operation GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL, a planned NEO for Zaire. KEARSARGE relieved NASSAU on May 2, 1997. With GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL phasing out, the 22nd MEU(SOC) and KEARSARGE received orders to begin contingency planning for a possible NEO in Sierra Leone on May 25th. KEARSARGE disengaged from GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL on May 26th and set for Sierra Leone with a scheduled arrival on the afternoon of May 29th. Operational planning for the concept of operation and course of action development had to be accomplished within a matter of days. Additionally, contingency planning to conduct the NEO was based on very ambiguous and constantly shifting circumstances in Sierra Leone.

⁶ Real World Rescue – Travel Security Consultants, "Chronology of the Evacuation of Sierra Leone," <http://www.realworldrescue.com/chronolo.htm>, p. 2.

From an intelligence perspective, the challenges were fundamentally a result of not having a preliminary baseline intelligence picture of the situation, and the short period to develop one. The challenges centered on the following categories:

Information vs. Intelligence. A significant emphasis has been placed on pursuing the COPERNICUS vision to support joint expeditionary operations. Beginning with our involvement in Grenada, significant lessons have been learned in the areas of interoperability, intelligence dissemination, and avoiding information/intelligence "stovepiping." DESERT STORM highlighted the need for improved intelligence communications connectivity. As a result, significant strides and investments have been realized in the area of communications.

During NOBLE OBELISK, information was accessed on INTELINK via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). This afforded intelligence planners a significant "reach-back" capability to the worldwide "information grid." While enhanced communications connectivity resulted in voluminous amounts of background information, very little **actionable** intelligence was produced which could address the most basic of Essential Elements of Information (EEI's).

Several reasons exist for this information overload. All national intelligence agencies and theater Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC's) have to support numerous requirements, however, meeting those requirements is based on intelligence priorities. The primary sources of intelligence --- imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) --- are focused in meeting those priorities. In a classic case of scarcity, the *actionable* and *technical* intelligence required to support contingency operations in remote, third world countries is outdated and ranges from sparse to negligible. In an attempt to meet intelligence requirements on lesser priority

areas, agencies post the little information that is available on these countries on INTELINK; most of which can be found via open-source channels. While this provides excellent background material, it does not meet a Joint Commander's threshold for operational and intelligence planning requirements.

"The Information Grid." During the four day period before executing the NEO, a significant amount of man-hours were expended using joint deployable intelligence support systems (JDISS) to access and request intelligence data via INTELINK. While the requestor must integrate all intelligence obtained from national, theater, or organic resources into the planning process,⁷ there is no central "one-stop shopping" access point or target *knowledge* base where information can be packaged and integrated as a whole to support the warfighter. This led to accessing a multitude of databases from numerous intelligence production centers in an attempt to accurately prepare the battlespace.

Communications and information technology has made tremendous advances in linking JTF's with major warfighting commands and national agencies. However, given a four-day planning timeline to develop a detailed analysis and intelligence estimate, this method of intelligence planning was problematic and cumbersome at best. By definition, NEO's are conducted under crisis and fluid conditions. They are, however, at the lower end of conflict and due to their dynamic nature; intelligence has a crucial role to play in

⁷ Joint Staff, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint Pub 2-01* (November 1996), p. III-44.

providing a better "situational awareness."⁸ National policy-makers will continue to use Naval expeditionary forces to respond to crises similar to NOBLE OBELISK. The methodology to develop and analyze a battlespace is a time-consuming process. Having to plan and prepare an intelligence estimate during an accelerated planning cycle increases the probability of uncertainty --- not an ideal circumstance for placing U.S. personnel in potentially hostile situations.

Augmentation. Great success has been realized in augmenting JTF's with National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs). They are uniquely designed for contingency operations and have been institutionalized for every major operation and exercise since DESERT STORM. Intelligence expertise drawn from theater intelligence centers and national agencies to include CIA, DIA, and NSA allows for enhanced analytical support to the JTF intelligence staff.

Due to the accelerated timeline and the location of the NEO, NIST augmentation was not a viable option for NOBLE OBELISK. A NIST had augmented JTF GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL for Zaire, however it had already disbanded. Augmentees from theater intelligence centers that had crossdecked from NASSAU to KEARSARGE had been released prior to the realization of a possible NEO in Sierra Leone. The time and distance factors in requesting NIST support made augmentation unfeasible.

Despite the intelligence challenges in NOBLE OBELISK, there were several key factors that served to validate *Forward ... from the Sea* concepts. These factors were a result of a careful look at the issues that had hampered intelligence procedures in the past and the strength of the organic surveillance and communications capabilities inherent to

⁸ Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995). P. 75.

the expeditionary force. An extensive effort was placed on streamlining intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP's), which focused on the integration of operational and I&W data. The result was a greater understanding of component capabilities and a high degree of personnel integration across operational and intelligence lines. Intelligence pre-deployment planning was to pay great dividends during the execution of the NEO's. Key factors were:

Contingency Planning Process. There is one very basic principle that is often overlooked --- the necessity for an intelligence and operational unity-of-effort. Lack of unity between operational and intelligence elements were endemic during Grenada and were often the result of "stovepiping" and service parochialism. Aboard KEARSARGE, the Navy and Marine Corps intelligence and cryptologic officers were members of the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and were involved at the outset of every planning initiative. The CAT composition and procedures were formalized during the amphibious squadron (PHIBRON)-MEU integration period (PMINT), five months before the KEARSARGE deployed.

The CAT process was thoroughly practiced during the intermediate phased training cycle and often met four to five times a day during exercises and real-world contingencies. The fine-tuning of this process was crucial to ensuring the intelligence cycle was focused early and in tune with the commander's objectives. At every phase, from concept of operation to course of action development, both operational and intelligence elements had a thorough understanding of capabilities, strengths, limitations, and gaps. This process is a key point that is often lost in the planning cycle. Its success ensured there were no disconnects in operational planning and intelligence support.

Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Doctrine. Another endemic problem that has plagued the intelligence community is dissemination. This issue has been highlighted on numerous occasions. In many cases, information was collected in a timely manner and analyzed correctly only to get bogged down in a dissemination system that failed to serve the customer.⁹

Prior to deploying, shipboard cryptologic personnel in coordination with all operational staff and shipboard elements developed a C2W doctrine and architecture aimed to ensuring the widest possible dissemination of intelligence and threat sensor data. Using the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) as the medium to manage C2 and intelligence information, the primary focus of the doctrine was to institute a common set of dissemination and reporting procedures between Navy and Marine operational and intelligence elements. This ensured the rapid dissemination and sharing of data between the major C2 and intelligence elements of the expeditionary force with the principle requirements being timeliness, usability of form, pertinence, and security.¹⁰ Again these procedures and concepts were exercised and refined during the intermediate phased training cycle and resulted in personnel from different specialties and backgrounds thoroughly understanding the production and dissemination process.

Organic Sensor Management. How does one answer, "How do you gain a fundamental baseline knowledge of a target where the U.S. intelligence community has

⁹ Thomas R. Wilson, "Joint Intelligence and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 1995), p. 56.

¹⁰ Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, Joint Pub 3-02* (October 1992), p. IV-4-5.

historically had little access?" Quite simply, the responsibility falls upon the on-scene unit, or in the case of NOBLE OBELISK, the elements comprising the Naval expeditionary force. The ability to effectively develop and use organic intelligence resources and sensors in an expeditionary force concept is critical to ensuring battlespace dominance and power projection in a littoral warfare scenario. This is especially true when the expeditionary force may be the only unit in position to access the intelligence.

The political and security situation in Sierra Leone was very complex, and as a whole, the intelligence requirements needed to cover the entire scope of situation in Sierra Leone were extensive. However, the tactical EEI's needed to support NOBLE OBELISK objectives were few and centered around the JTF Commander's concept of operation and courses of action. The EEI's focused on identifying the intent of the different factions in Sierra Leone with regards to U.S. presence, whether a NEO would be conducted under a hostile or permissive environment, and any intelligence that would enhance U.S. situational awareness. Another advantage was that the NEO planned only in the area of Freetown, specifically in the vicinity of the Aberdeen Peninsula. As a result, it was only critical to develop a situational awareness picture for Freetown and its surrounding areas, vice the entire country. Any other intelligence produced would be beneficial, but not **critical** to U.S. operations.

The LHD amphibious assault class vessels possess a highly robust signals acquisition system. Known as COMBAT DF, this system can detect, locate, categorize and archive Indications & Warning (I&W) data into the ship's tactical data systems.¹¹ This system, designed for a littoral environment, was ideally suited to focus its collection

¹¹ FAS – Intelligence Resource Program, "AN/SRS-1A(V) Combat Direction Finding," <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/cdf.htm>, p. 1.

resources to identify critical EEI's. Navy and Marine Corps personnel used this system to conduct an intensive threat survey to analyze and determine the environment in the vicinity of Freetown. Additionally, while en route, communications were established with the State Department Crisis Support Cell, the embassy personnel in Freetown, and an 11-man Army Special Forces Training Team, which had been conducting training in Sierra Leone prior to the coup. The threat analysis intelligence derived from on board sensors was corroborated with situational reports being passed by the State Department and the Special Forces Team. As a result, when KEARSARGE arrived in Sierra Leone on May 29, 1997 the JTF Commander had a good preliminary intelligence baseline of the different threats around Freetown.

Once operating offshore, maximum use was made from all-source intelligence assets to support the operation. Tactical air reconnaissance, photography, and additional information passed by State Department personnel and the Special Forces Training Team provided invaluable insight to the situation.

Intelligence management and connectivity. Prior to deploying, Navy and Marine Corps intelligence personnel visited and received in-depth briefings on intelligence and military support capabilities from several national intelligence agencies. These contacts and a thorough understanding of national systems support to military operations proved essential during NOBLE OBELISK.

The synchronization and collaboration of national and tactical systems to produce an effective collection management plan during GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL served as an excellent precursor to operations in Sierra Leone. Having developed the preliminary intelligence baseline by May 29th, intelligence personnel aboard KEARSARGE and the national intelligence agencies were able to collaborate in near-real time environment via

JWICS on perishable intelligence data being produced from national and tactical systems. This collaboration served to produce a well-rounded intelligence picture ideally tailored to support the battlespace and the JTF Commander's requirements.

During the course of the one-week period in Sierra Leone, JTF NOBLE OBELISK was able to execute military operations, which satisfied national policy objectives to their successful conclusion. Intelligence was able to produce and maintain an accurate battlespace awareness picture that was highly flexible to changing operational requirements. I&W data was rapidly disseminated to the major C2 elements of the JTF and to national and theater policy makers throughout the duration of the operation.

The situation in Sierra Leone was highly complex, and while having to focus on a relatively small area, the intelligence produced was enormous. On June 2nd, the AFRC/RUF forces engaged with ECOMOG forces around Freetown. Fighting for the two main airports near Freetown, Hastings and Lunge, as well as other strategic facilities, was fierce and resulted in numerous casualties. Additionally, reinforcements from Nigeria arrived by sea and ships began shelling the area in the vicinity of Freetown harbor.

Amidst the fighting and continued looting, the JTF conducted three NEO's. The dissemination of valued intelligence was a decisive point in deciding where and how to extract American citizens and designated third-country nationals. The first two NEO's were conducted via CH-46 Sea Knight and CH-53E Super Stallions with AH-1W Super Cobras and AV-8B Harriers providing force protection. As open hostilities between the AFRC/RUF and the Nigerians erupted, it was decided to secure a beachhead area on the Aberdeen peninsula to facilitate the third NEO. Light armored vehicles and armed

personnel were placed ashore during a U.S. State Department and United Kingdom negotiated cease-fire.

Communications is the critical link in operations.¹² Deploying forces received continuous I&W updates during the entire amphibious phase. While ashore, on-scene Marine Corps collection assets linked with KEARSARGE supported the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and NEO operations. Despite the high threat environment, I&W and force protection data allowed for the third NEO to evacuate more than 1,200 persons in less than five hours. KEARSARGE served to link tactical assets ashore, while reporting on-scene developments on the precarious security environment to national and theater decision-makers.

The operational concepts in *Forward ... from the Sea*, stress the need for a Naval expeditionary force to respond to a variety of missions and to operate independently in a littoral environment. Operation NOBLE OBELISK is a classic example of an expeditionary force responding quickly and executing national policy objectives. In a fast paced and ambiguous environment, information superiority is a key element to ensuring battlespace dominance and power projection.

But what is "information superiority?" As defined in *JV 2010*, it is "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." Inherent to a Naval expeditionary force are extensive C4ISR collection, processing, and dissemination capabilities, but is this alone sufficient to guarantee information superiority?

¹² Kenneth Allard, "Lessons Unlearned: Somalia," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 1995), p. 106.

From an intelligence perspective, NOBLE OBELISK highlighted several areas that address this issue.

Perhaps the most powerful capability that supported the intelligence process, was the strong C4I architecture inherent to the force. This capability, however, is a two-edged sword. The excellent "reachback" capabilities resident in JWICS allowed for real-time collaboration with national and theater intelligence agencies and resulted in synchronizing tactical and national collection systems to provide optimum support to the NEO. Throughout the operation, national and theater decision-makers received continuous updates on the situation. Further advances in communications and information technology will continue to increase the ability of deployed forces to "reachback."

Conversely, the ability to reachback and access valued information can be a laborious process. This is especially true when deployed personnel have to access multiple databases in an attempt to identify *the* critical piece of information needed to support the operation. An example during NOBLE OBELISK which highlighted this issue was the problem of finding accurate landing beach data for Sierra Leone. This seemingly small piece of information is critical to any amphibious landing. Numerous man-hours were dedicated to finding this bit of information from multiple intelligence databases, only to find it eventually discover it on open source channels.

This "reachback" philosophy also implies one direction. Perhaps it is better to emphasize a *push/pull* concept. JWICS connectivity currently allows for near real-time collaboration between national, theater and forward deployed units. The essential missing piece is a methodology which is tailored to supporting forward-deployed units in

a timely manner. Ideally, a theater intelligence center working closely with the national intelligence community should serve as the intelligence integration center focused on pushing forward tailored intelligence data to deployed forces. Theater intelligence centers need to keep pace with technology and expand their data mining and analysis capabilities. Data mining software engines can collect massive amounts of data from databases and identify correlations, pattern recognition, and perform high-speed analysis to develop useful information from raw data.¹³ This concept results in quickly accessing databases and information without having to access a list of homepages. A theater intelligence center with robust data mining capabilities, collaborating with national intelligence agencies, and focused on tactical requirements can be better situated to support mission planning, battlespace preparation, and “push forward” timely intelligence which is tailored to a JTF commander’s requirements.

Although communications technology will increase, the success in producing the decisive intelligence to the JTF commander and forces ashore during NOBLE OBELISK was not the result of a “collection, processing, and dissemination capability,” as defined in *JV 2010*. Information superiority is perhaps too narrowly focused on technology and the movement of information rather than the idea of gaining knowledge.¹⁴ The key to the intelligence success in Sierra Leone was the expeditionary forces’ ability to produce the **actionable** intelligence tailored to meet the JTF Commander’s requirements.

Technological capabilities supported the intelligence production process, but it was the

¹³ Paul Foote, “Data Analysis and Data Mining,” Faulkner Information Services (February 1999), p. 1.

¹⁴ F.G. Hoffman, “Joint Vision 2010: A Marine Perspective,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1997-1998), p. 36.

human element that used these tools to develop the intelligence baseline and analyze all the available *information* to produce the *intelligence* required for the operation.

An expeditionary force operating in remote areas will continue to be the primary source of intelligence. As in a NOBLE OBELISK scenario, intelligence personnel will have to quickly identify the critical information needed to support the tactical decision making process. Intelligence TTP's and C2W doctrine which address how intelligence will be used to support the commander's objectives requires a thorough understanding of how tactical and national collection systems interact to support a deployed force. While the use of systems capabilities and technologies as envisioned in *Forward ... From the Sea* are essential, it is the human factors of leadership, knowledge and core competency that are necessary to support the operational concepts and ensure a successful outcome.